Introduction
The existence of equilibriu:m points in finite ga:me s, as formulated by von Neu:mann and Morgenstern [11] , [6] , [7] , has been established by Nash [8] , [91.
The :method of proof is analytic, e:mploying a fixed point argu:ment.
We give an algebraic characterization of e quilibriu:m points in Theore:ms 1 and In. This raises the possibility (so far unresolved) of an algebraic proof of Nash's existence theore:m. We also show that equilibriu:m points can be described in ter:ms of sol utions to certain nonlinear progra :ms in Theorems 2. and 2n. The se generalize well-known equivalences between :matrix ga:mes a nd linear progra:ms [1] , [2] , [3] , [10] .
In Theore:m 3, equilibriu:m points f o r a t wo-person (nonzero-sum) ga:me are further characterized in solutions of a syste:m f linear inequalities in which certain variables :must be integers. This c h a r acte r i zation, i n c onjunction with technique s of integer linear progra:m:ming [4] , a llo ws t h e pos sibi lity of syste:matic co:mputation of equilibrium points for t he t wo-pe rson c a se.
Finally, in Theore:m 4, we note a u rio u s relation between the Lagrange :multipliers and the original variables o f the non lin e a r p r ogra:ms of Theore:ms 2 and 2n; a solution to these progra:ms plays a dua l r o l e , serving si:multaneously as values for the original variables a nd as L a gra nge :multi pliers.
Since our general sche:me can be e a sil y i nfe r red f ro:m the treat:ment of two-person ga:mes, this case is treated f irst . We use the conveniences of :matrix notation; e will denote a vector (row or colu:mn) with each entry I , while vector or :matrix inequalitie s hold entry by e ntry. An equilibriwn point is a pair of mixed strategies, (x~ yL such that for all
xAy 2 xAy, xBy > xBy.
A theorem due to Nash [9] as serts the existe c of an equilibrium point for every game G. We note, for later reference, that A and B Dlay be taken so 0 < a,. < 1,
-IJo < b , . < .l (all i and j), by a. change in s cale a nd origin of the payoff measurements -1J-without loss of generality in regard to equilib rium points. On the other hand . . let (x~ y , a g ~) b e a solu ti on 'o r p r ogr am. P. The theorem of Nash guarantees the exi s ten ce f an e qw lib r i u rn point (x~ y) f or game G and thereby , by the r e asoning a b v e , t h e xis t ne e f a solu i on 4.
(x, y, a? ~) for program P with value zero. Then we have, for (x, y, a, I3),
This is the system of Theorem 1; hence (x, y) is an equilibrium point of game G. On the other hand , let (x, y , ,(3) satisfy the s y s t e m of Theorem 1, and defil).e
We also note, since 0 < a .. < 1,
, o < 13 = xBy < 1.
5.
Then 1 it can be readily verified that (x, y, a: 13, u, v) satisfies the s y stem of Theorem 3.
n-Person Garnes
An n-per son game G in normalized form is characterized by an n n-vector of multilinear payoff forms in n vectors, t h e mixed strate gi es o f the players -1. e. , The theorem of Nash as s er t s that every game G , for n every fin i te n, h a s an equilibrium poi n t . x . £ X . , Theorem 2n.
x is an equilibrium point of game G n if and only if (x, a) is a solution for program P .
n The equivalence of Theorem 2n between game G and program P n n suggests the possibility of further characterization through t he introduction 6. and interpretation of Lagrange multipliers from nonlin ear programming theory [5}, [12] . Curiously enough, no further information is f orthcoming as the following statement shows. We leave its demonst rat ion for the reader. 
